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PER and FER Purposes
• Preliminary Experiment Review (PER):
– “Is this the right experiment or study to address the research 
question(s)?”
• Final Experiment Review (FER):
– “Has the experiment or study been designed/planned the right 
way?”
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Outline
• Background
– Detect And Avoid (DAA) Issues
– Overview of Controller Acceptability Study 1 (CAS1) Results
– Overview of Controller Acceptability Study 2 (CAS2) Results
• Upcoming Study Focus
– Controller Acceptability Study 3 (CAS3) aka Collision Avoidance, Self 
Separation, and Alerting Times (CASSAT)
– Builds on CAS1 and CAS2
– Looking at acceptability of GCS display alerting times for both the GCS 
pilot and the Air Traffic Controller (to be tested separately)
– Methodology
– Schedule
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The Sense and Avoid (SAA) Challenge for UAS
• Pilots are required to see and avoid other aircraft
– 14CFR 91.111 (a) No person may operate an aircraft so close to another aircraft as 
to create a collision hazard.
– 14CFR 91.113 (b) General. When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether 
an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance 
shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid 
other aircraft. When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the 
pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it 
unless well clear.
• Sense and Avoid (SAA) was defined by the FAA sponsored SAA for 
UAS Workshop Final Report published in October 9, 2009 as “the 
combination of UAS Self-Separation (SS) plus Collision Avoidance (CA) 
as a means of compliance with 14CFR Part 91, §91.111 and §91.113”
• SAA-equipped UAS should seamlessly interoperate with other aircraft, 
air traffic services and existing collision avoidance technologies
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From the SAA Workshop Final Report:*
• Self Separation (SS) Function
• SS is “essential” and “could be the only function” of SAA
• Intended as a means to remain “well clear”
• “Normal/operational, non obtrusive maneuvers”
• Maneuvers made early enough to avoid CA activation
• Collision Avoidance (CA) Function
• CA engages “when all other modes of separation fail”
• Intended as a means to avoid Near Mid-Air Collisions 
(NMACs)
• CA maneuvers made “within a relatively short time 
horizon before closest point of approach [CPA]”
* Sense and Avoid (SAA) for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS).  Prepared by: FAA Sponsored Sense and Avoid 
Workshop, October 9, 2009.
Self Separation and Collision Avoidance
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CV, CAT, SSV, SST and “Well Clear”
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Collision Volume (CV)
Collision Avoidance Threshold (CAT)
Self-Separation Threshold (SST)
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Self-Separation Volume (SSV)
Note: CAT, SSV and SST boundaries are notional and generally not cylindrical
Workshop Model with NASA SSI Concept’s Self-Separation Volume 
(SSV):
• SSV size should be large enough to avoid:
• Corrective RAs for TCAS-equipped intruders
• Safety concerns for controllers
• Undue concern for proximate see-and-avoid pilots
• SSV size should be small enough to avoid disruptions to 
traffic flow
• SSV size should vary appropriately with operational area 
(airport vicinity, en route, etc.)
Determination of minimum and maximum operationally
acceptable SSV sizes will inform the design space for
required SAA surveillance accuracy
Clear of Self Separation Volume (SSV) = Well Clear
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SAA “Self Separation Bands” Concept
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If Ownship trajectory will pass within HMD laterally of intruder then
• “Self Separation Bands” will appear on Ownship trajectory when within 
specified declaration time of the Tau boundary
• Pilot will need to negotiate a trajectory change outside of Bands
No Bands will appear on trajectory if it will pass outside of HMD
Horizontal Miss
Distance (HMD)
(Declaration Time) (TCAS “Tau” Boundary)
Notes:
2. HMD and “Tau” Boundary values are altitude-dependent for TCAS
1. Notional drawing
3. Drawing assumes insufficient vertical separation (e.g., co-altitude)
9Self Separation Bands Example
Head-On Encounter:
• Global Hawk (194 kts, 3 deg/sec turn)
• Grey Eagle (108 kts, 1 deg/sec turn)
• Declaration Time = 120 secs
• “TCAS Bands” (20 sec tau, .35 nmi HMD)
• Different Performance = Different Bands
Global Hawk
Gray Eagle
Tau and HMD for TCAS
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• TCAS Tau and HMD values for RA issuance are altitude-
dependent (lower values at lower altitudes):
• Self Separation HMD distances should be no smaller than TCAS 
HMD values but may need to be larger for controller acceptability
Own Altitude (ft) Tau (sec) HMD (nmi) HMD + 50%
< 1000 AGL N/A N/A N/A
1000-2350 AGL 15 0.20 0.30
2350-5000 20 0.35 0.53
5000-10000 25 0.55 0.83
10000-20000 30 0.80 1.2
20000-42000 35 1.1 1.7
>42000 35 1.1 1.7
HMD versus Encounter Geometry
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• TCAS will not activate an RA if HMD is cleared, regardless of 
encounter geometry:
• Air traffic controllers and proximate manned aircraft pilots may 
desire more than TCAS HMD, especially for crossing geometries 
HMD HMDHMD
Unacceptably Large HMD
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• Excessively large HMD will be disruptive to traffic flow:
HMD
HMD
UAS on final approach, 
intruder on downwind leg
UAS “well clear” deviation 
causes secondary conflicts
CAS1 Overview of Simulation Results
Based on 14 ATC Test Subjects
1176 Horizontal Miss Distance Acceptability Ratings
13
UAS-NAS SSI HITL Traffic Scenario Area
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Initial scenarios focused on ATC 
sector handling arrivals to Collin 
County Regional (McKinney –
TKI), ~28 nmi NE of DFW
Feature-rich airspace:
•Class B, 4000-11000’ above TKI
•VFR & IFR aircraft all under positive 
control, all cooperative
•Class D, SFC-2900’ around TKI
•VFR & IFR cooperative aircraft 
receiving Class D ATC services
Class E, 700’ or 1200’ up to FL180 
and outside Class B and D
•IFR aircraft
•VFR aircraft, some receiving ATC 
services, some not
•Some non-cooperative traffic 
outside of 30 nmi Mode C veil
•Class G, SFC to overlying airspace
•Nearby non-towered airports
•Visual checkpoints
Illustration of Head-on Scenario
Head-on Co-Altitude Traffic While on Approach
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Rating scale used for encounter assessment
After each “well clear encounter” test subjects were asked to rate the 
horizontal miss distance on a five-point scale:
1. Much too close; unsafe or potentially so; cause or potential 
cause for issuance of a traffic alert
2. Somewhat close, some cause for concern
3. Neither unsafely close nor disruptively large, did not perceive 
the encounter to be an issue
4. Somewhat wide, a bit unexpected; might be disruptive or 
potentially disruptive in congested airspace and/or with high 
workload
5. Excessively wide, unexpected; disruptive or potentially 
disruptive in congested airspace and/or with high workload
Fractional responses, e.g., 1.5 … 4.5 were acceptable
Note that some encounters did not result in a maneuver by the UAS
16
Ratings by Horizontal Miss Distance (HMD)
Mean of 14 ATC subjects for each encounter
The plot above includes only Crossing encounters,
but at all speed differences between encounter aircraft.
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Horizontal Miss Distance (nmi)
Ratings for All Crossings (All Speeds)
Ratings for UA faster than encounter aircraft
Mean of 14 ATC subjects for each encounter
Plot of frequency of Rating responses when UA was 
faster than the encounter aircraft.
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Horizontal Miss Distance (nmi)
Ratings for Crossings (UA Faster)
Note: Horizontal Miss Distances > 1.5 nmi required a UAS lateral maneuver
Ratings for UA slower than encounter aircraft 
Mean of 14 ATC subjects for each encounter
Plot of frequency of Rating responses when UA 
was slower than the encounter aircraft.
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Horizontal Miss Distance (nmi)
Ratings for Crossings (UA Slower)
Note: All Horizontal Miss Distances achieved without a UAS lateral maneuver
Ratings for Overtake encounters 
Mean of 14 ATC subjects for each encounter
Plot of frequency of Rating responses for overtake encounters.
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Horizontal Miss Distance (nmi)
Ratings by HMD (Overtake)
Note: All Horizontal Miss Distances required a UAS lateral maneuver (initially a collision course)
Ratings for Opposite Direction encounters 
Mean of 14 ATC subjects for each encounter
Plot of frequency of Rating responses for 
opposite direction encounters.
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Horizontal Miss Distance (nmi)
Ratings by HMD (Opposite Direction)
Note: All Horizontal Miss Distances required a UAS lateral maneuver (initially a collision course)
Ratings for Same-speed Crossing encounters 
Mean of 14 ATC subjects for each encounter
Plot of frequency of Rating responses when 
both aircraft were at the same speed.
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Horizontal Miss Distance (nmi)
Ratings for Crossings (Same Speed)
Note: Horizontal Miss Distances > 1.5 nmi required a UAS lateral maneuver
CAS1 Conclusions
• A horizontal miss distance (HMD) of ~1.5 nmi appears to be optimal for 
ATC acceptability (away from the airport vicinity)
• HMD of 1.5 nmi is >150% larger than the TCAS RA HMD for all airspace 
below Class A, and 136% larger in Class A
• 500’ IFR-VFR vertical separation (with no vertical closure rate) was 
universally acceptable as noted during debrief sessions (some controllers 
were Ok with less)
• Controllers think the SAA integration concept as presented is viable
– “definitely viable”
– “absolutely viable”
– “really impressed, way beyond expectations” [from before seeing it]
– [worked] “surprisingly well”
– “impressed with it”
– “don’t see any controller having an issue with” [concept as seen]
• 1.5 nmi HMD matches controller separation standards between VFR and 
large/turbojet IFR aircraft in Class B airspace
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Based on 7 ATC Test Subjects
588 Horizontal Miss Distance Acceptability Ratings
• Based on CAS1, but with fewer Horizontal Miss 
Distances – reduced based on CAS1 results
• Addition of winds
• Addition of communications delays that might be 
expected in operations of UAS controlled by way of 
satellite links
24
CAS2 Overview of Simulation Results
CAS2 Research Focus and Questions
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Focus: Effect of Simulated SAA-Equipped UAS on Air Traffic Controller 
Acceptability and Workload when differing horizontal spacing parameters are 
used in the SAA algorithms and under conditions of calm and moderate winds 
and with varied time delays in the communications link
Specific Questions:
A. Given wind and communications delay conditions, are SAA self separation (SS) 
maneuvers too small/too late, resulting in issuance of traffic safety alerts or controller 
perceptions of unsafe conditions? Tested by traffic encounters with smaller Horizontal Miss 
Distances (HMD).
B. Given wind and communications delay conditions, are SAA SS maneuvers too large 
(excessive “well clear” distances), resulting in behavior the controller would not expect 
and/or disruptions to traffic flow? Tested by traffic encounters with larger Horizontal Miss 
Distances (HMD).
C. Given wind and communications delay conditions, are there acceptable, in terms of ATC 
ratings, workload, and closest point of approach data, SAA miss distances that can be 
applied to the development of SAA algorithms?
D. Do communications delays for the UAS in the airspace result in an impact on the 
controllers communications flow?  Are the delays disruptive in terms of transmissions 
being “stepped-on” (simultaneous transmissions by several aircraft), or are additional 
repeats of information required with delays.
• Subjects: 
– Seven recently retired Air Traffic Controllers familiar with the 
Dallas-Ft. Worth East side 
– UAS and simulated manned aircraft were controlled by pseudo-
pilots at control stations in a different room 
– 14 UAS traffic encounters each hour with additional traffic to 
achieve a realistic workload level
– Six test hours over a two-day span 
– 588 total traffic encounters
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Research Design - Subjects
Independent Variables
• Horizontal Miss Distance (3 values: 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, nmi)
• Encounter Geometry (3 values: opposite-direction, crossing, overtake)
• Intruder opposite-direction at 180 degrees +/- 15 degrees (non-crossing)
• Intruder to right at 90 degrees +/- 15 degrees (crossing)
• Intruder ahead at 0 degrees +/- 15 degrees (overtaking, non-crossing)
• All geometries without vertical separation (but may include climbing/descending trajectories)
• Ownship passes to right of intruder for non-crossing geometries
• Ownship passes in front of intruder for crossing geometries
• Intruder Speed Differential (5 values for crossing: 0, +/- 40, +/- 80 kts)
• 42 test conditions: 6 opposite-direction, 6 overtake, 30 crossing
• 14 encounters per hour (based on CAS1, tested extensively)
• Wind Conditions (2 levels: Low and Moderate) 
• Communications Delay (0, 400, 1200, 1800 msec)
• 6 One-hour test sessions
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Research Design - Dependent Variables
• Human Operator Performance Metrics:  
– Horizontal Miss Distance Ratings (verbal after each encounter)
– Workload ratings by Air Traffic Workload Input Technique (ATWIT) like 
methodology at 5-minute intervals
– Post-scenario questionnaires (after each hour)
• System Performance Metrics:  
– Aircraft-Aircraft separation distances for each encounter (Closest Point 
of Approach – CPA)
– Counts of Instances of “step-ons” (two stations transmitting at the same 
time; neither can be understood)
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Mean Ratings by Encounter distance (Crossings)
1 Much too close; unsafe or potentially 
so; cause or potential cause for 
issuance of a traffic alert
2 Somewhat close, some cause for 
concern
3 Neither unsafely close nor disruptively 
large, did not perceive the encounter 
to be an issue
4 Somewhat wide, a bit unexpected; 
might be disruptive or potentially 
disruptive in congested airspace 
and/or with high workload
5 Excessively wide, unexpected; 
disruptive or potentially disruptive in 
congested airspace and/or with high 
workload
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Rating Scale Definitions
Ratings by Horizontal Miss Distance (Crossings)
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1 Much too close; unsafe or potentially 
so; cause or potential cause for 
issuance of a traffic alert
2 Somewhat close, some cause for 
concern
3 Neither unsafely close nor disruptively 
large, did not perceive the encounter 
to be an issue
4 Somewhat wide, a bit unexpected; 
might be disruptive or potentially 
disruptive in congested airspace 
and/or with high workload
5 Excessively wide, unexpected; 
disruptive or potentially disruptive in 
congested airspace and/or with high 
workload
Rating Scale Definitions
Ratings by HMD for Overtake and Opposite Direction
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1 Much too close; unsafe or potentially 
so; cause or potential cause for 
issuance of a traffic alert
2 Somewhat close, some cause for 
concern
3 Neither unsafely close nor disruptively 
large, did not perceive the encounter 
to be an issue
4 Somewhat wide, a bit unexpected; 
might be disruptive or potentially 
disruptive in congested airspace 
and/or with high workload
5 Excessively wide, unexpected; 
disruptive or potentially disruptive in 
congested airspace and/or with high 
workload
Rating Scale Definitions
Additional CAS2 Findings
• Traffic Density - “Rate the realism of the Traffic Density of the simulation 
during the preceding hour,” 
– 66.7% of responses were “Traffic Density was about the same as would be 
found in real world operations” 
– 31.0% of the responses were “Traffic Density was somewhat lower than real 
world operations.” 
• Wind – No issues or performance differences attributable to the “low” 
and “moderate” wind conditions 
• Communications Delays – no differences in HMD or workload ratings, 
however comments reflected the difficulties that long delays caused.
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CAS3 - Collision Avoidance, Self 
Separation, and Alerting Times (CASSAT)
33
CAS-3 Objectives
This experiment will address minimum and maximum acceptable 
declaration times for projected well clear losses, from the 
perspectives of both the air traffic controller and the UA pilot, i.e., 
what declaration times are excessive, leading to nuisance alerts 
for controllers and UA pilots and what times are too short 
providing insufficient time to query/negotiate maneuvers with ATC 
and execute them before triggering TCAS RAs. For this 
experiment a concept for the functional integration of CA&SS 
functions will be developed together with pilot procedures, 
controller-pilot interactions and options for compatible SS and CA 
indicators and alerts. The ongoing implementation involves the 
integration of Daidalus (update from Stratway+) with TCAS as a 
CA capability for the UA.  
34
History of Aircraft Separation Algorithms
Research Questions
• Given a projected well clear loss, what is the minimum acceptable declaration 
time?
• Given a projected well clear loss, what is the maximum acceptable declaration 
time?
• Which, if any, of the declaration times are too excessive leading to nuisance 
alerts for the controllers and UA pilots?
• Which, if any, of the declaration times are too short providing insufficient time to 
query/negotiate maneuvers with ATC and execute said maneuvers before 
triggering TCAS RAs?
• Is there an interaction between Alerting Time and Horizontal Miss Distance?
• Given the TCAS alerting symbology sets, does the change in display icons 
(between caution and warning) affect the saliency of alert levels to the UA pilot?
• In Vertical encounters, does prediction of time to co-altitude (TCOA) affect 
acceptability of the Alert?
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Scenario Environment
• Similar to CAS-1 and CAS-2, the scenarios will be focused on 
the ATC sector handling arrivals to Collin County Regional 
(now known as McKinney National – KTKI), which is 
approximately 28 nmi NE of Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW), and the 
surrounding airspace and airports
• Traffic in the scenario includes 14 encounters per hour 
between GA aircraft that are transponding but not in voice 
communications with ATC, and UAS (large).  In addition there 
are approximately 45 additional aircraft per hour (Background 
traffic) in the same airspace that are also in communications 
with the subject Controller.
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CAS3 (CASSAT) Methodology 
Two-part study based on CAS1 and CAS2 methodology
(1) UAS ground control station pilots as subjects, ATC is part of experimental 
team; varied Alerting Times and Horizontal Miss Distances
• 12 pilots total; 6 UAS pilots and 6 IFR pilots
• Pilots will fly multiple-UAS each hour in the DFW area using MACS interface with 
additional alerting symbology incorporated
(2) ATC subjects rating acceptability of UAS encounters with non-
communicating (with ATC; but transponding) aircraft when UAS self-separate 
with varied alerting times (Variable of interest, fixed levels)
• 10 active ATC (experience at DFW a plus, but training on the sector for all)
• Similar to CAS1 and CAS2 except additional sector traffic to boost workload and 
addition of several vertical traffic encounters per hour
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CAS3 (CASSAT) Methodology (2)
• Independent Variables
– Horizontal Miss Distance (0.7, 1.0 and 1.5 nmi)
– Alerting Times (used by Daidalus algorithms)
30 sec, 45 sec, 75 sec
– Time to Co-altitude (TCOA) for vertical encounters (used by Daidalus
algorithms)
0 and 20 sec 
Vertical Rates 1000 and 3000 feet per minute (between encountering aircraft)
• Variables from CAS1 and CAS2 being held Constant
– Wind – only medium wind profile for all encounters
– Communications delay – 400 msec for all UAS voice communications
• UAS GCS display manipulations
– Pilots will rate candidate alerting symbology sets
– For pilot subject runs, will require triggering TCAS on some encounters to 
see full range of symbology
39
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Matrix of test combinations (Update)
Alerting Time 0.7 nmi HMD 1.0 nmi HMD 1.5 nmi HMD
30 sec √ √ √
45 sec √ √ √
75 sec √ √ √
Horizontal encounters
Vertical encounters
Vert Rate 0 sec TCOA 20 sec TCOA
1000 fpm √ √
3000 fpm √ √
A special case at high altitude is needed to test 5000 fpm (only for UAS pilot testing)
Data Analyses
• Many of the distance (HMD) and time (Alerting Time) research 
questions can be answered through descriptive statistics and graphical 
methods alone, such as was done for CAS1 and CAS2
• Where needed, ratio scaled variables, such as miss distance errors will 
be analyzed by parametric methods (e.g., within-subjects ANOVA)
– If needed, acceptability ratings can be analyzed by within-subjects ANOVA
• Some data represent counts (e.g., frequency of selected events, ATC 
re-route issued, errors noted, etc.) and will be handled by non-
parametric methods (e.g., Cochran Q {repeated} or Chi-square 
{independent})
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Facilities and Resources
• The experiment will be run in a dedicated UAS facility within the ATOL. 
This part of the lab runs a NASA LaRC modified version of the Multi 
Aircraft Control System (MACS).*
• The two UAS GCS pilots will utilize the MACS interface within one of the 
pilot station rooms within the ATOL.
• The implementation team is from SGT, Adaptive Aerospace Group 
(AAG), and Intelligent Automation, Inc. (IAI) 
* In case of major scheduling difficulties, a dedicated UAS lab facility, currently housed at 
Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies (SGT), can be used. The lab at SGT was used to run CAS-1 
and CAS-2.
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ATOL areas for the CASSAT study
Assumptions and Risks
• Acquiring Active Controllers
– Will be searching for active controllers with some DFW experience
– Current DFW controllers are NOT available
• Scheduling conflicts within the ATOL – can run while IMAC 
checkout is going on
• Scheduling conflicts with individual subjects
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Desired Outcomes
• To obtain enough subjective and objective data points to analyze the 
acceptable declaration time for projected well-clear losses
• To obtain subjective feedback from UA pilots regarding the GCS display
• Deliver preliminary results at an SC-228 plenary
• Deliver a technical report to the project office documenting the results 
and lessons learned
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Proposed Daily Schedule UAS Pilot Runs
Day 1
• 8:30 Arrival & Briefing
• 9:00 Familiarization & Training
• 10:30 Data Run (Selected from 
Hours 1, 2, or 3)
• 11:45 Post Run Evals
• 12:00 Lunch Break
• 1:00 Reconvene at Sim
• 1:30 Data Run (Selected from 
Hours 1, 2, or 3) 
• 2:45 Post Run Eval / Break
• 3:00 Data Run (Selected from 
Hours 1, 2, or 3)
• 4:15 Post Run Eval
Day 2
• 8:30 Arrival & Briefing
• 9:30 Data Run (Selected from 
Hours 4, 5, or 6)
• 10:45 Post Run Evals / Break
• 11:00 Data Run (Selected from 
Hours 4, 5, or 6)
• 12:15 Post Run Eval / Lunch
• 1:30 Reconvene at Sim
• 1:45 Data Run (Selected from 
Hours 4, 5, or 6) 
• 3:00 Post Run Eval /
• 3:15 Debriefing
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Proposed Daily Schedule ATC Test Subjects
47
Day 1 - Training
• 8:30 Arrival & Briefing
• 9:00 Familiarization & 
Training Run 4
• 10:15 Break
• 10:30 Data Run (Selected 
from Hours 1, 2, or 3)
• 11:45 Post Run Evals
• 12:00 Lunch Break
• 1:00 Reconvene at Sim
• 1:30 Data Run (Selected 
from Hours 1, 2, or 3) 
• 2:45 Post Run Eval / 
Break
• 3:00 Data Run (Selected 
from Hours 1, 2, or 3)
• 4:15 Post Run Eval
Day 2 – Data Runs
• 8:30 Arrival & Briefing
• 9:30 Data Run 
(Selected from Hours 
4, 5, or 6)
• 10:45 Post Run Evals
/ Break
• 11:00 Data Run 
(Selected from Hours 
4, 5, or 6)
• 12:15 Post Run Eval / 
Lunch
• 1:30 Reconvene at 
Sim
• 1:45 Data Run 
(Selected from Hours 
4, 5, or 6) 
• 3:00 Post Run Eval /
• 3:15 Debriefing
Day 3 – Data Runs
• 8:30 Arrival & Overview 
Briefing
• 9:30 Familiarization with 
DFW D10
• 11:30 Training Run 1
• 12:00 Lunch Break
• 1:00 Reconvene at Sim
Review Procedures
• 1:30 Training Run 2
• 2:45 Post Run Eval / 
Feedback
• 3:00 Training Run 3
• 4:15 Post Run Eval / 
Feedback
CAS3 (CASSAT) Schedule
Event Date
• IRB (Institutional Review Board) Document In Progress
• Experiment Review (PER/FER) March 6, 2015
• “Dress Rehearsal” runs April 2015 (second half)
• Data Collection UAS Pilots April 2015 (begin last week)
• Data Collection ATC Subjects May-July 2015
• Data Analysis complete November 2015
• Documentation complete March 2016
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April 2015
49
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
29 30 31 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15 16 17 18
19 20
ATC Dress 
Rehearsal
21
ATC Dress 
Rehearsal
22
ATC Dress 
Rehearsal
23
Pilot Dress 
Rehearsal
24
Pilot Dress 
Rehearsal
25
26 27
Pilots 1 & 2
28
Pilots 1 & 2
29 30
Pilots 3 & 4
1
Pilots 3 &4
2
May 2015
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Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
26 27 28 29 30 1
Active ATC 
Requested
2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23
24/31 25
Memorial Day
26 27 28 29 30
Plenary Week – No Runs
Active ATC Subject #1
Active ATC Subject #2
Active ATC Subject #3
June 2015
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Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
31 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17 18 19 20
21 22 23 24 25 26 27
28 29 30 1 2 3
4th of July 
Observed
4
Independence 
Day
Active ATC Subject #5
Active ATC Subject #7
Active ATC Subject #4
Active ATC Subject #6
Active ATC Subject #8
July 2015
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Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
28 29 30 1 2 3
4th of July 
Observed
4
Independence 
Day
5 6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15 16 17 18
19 20
Pilots 5 & 6
21
Pilots 5 & 6
22 23
Pilots 7 & 8
24
Pilots 7 & 8
25
26 27
Pilots 9 & 10
28
Pilots 9 & 10
29 30
Pilots 11 & 12
31
Pilots 11 & 12
1
Active ATC Subject #9
Active ATC Subject #10
August 2015
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Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
26 27 28 29 30 31 1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15
16 17 18 19 20 21 22
23/30 24/31 25 26 27 28 29
Extra Available Data Collection Week
Extra Available Data Collection Week
Questions?
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After Cassat
